Aesthetic preference for art emerges from a weighted integration over hierarchically structured visual features in the brain

It is an open question whether preferences for visual art can be lawfully predicted from the basic constituent elements of a visual image. Moreover, little is known about how such preferences are actually constructed in the brain. Here we developed and tested a computational framework to gain an understanding of how the human brain constructs aesthetic value. We show that it is possible to explain human preferences for a piece of art based on an analysis of features present in the image. This was achieved by analyzing the visual properties of drawings and photographs by multiple means, ranging from image statistics extracted by computer vision tools, subjective human ratings about attributes, to a deep convolutional neural network. Crucially, it is possible to predict subjective value ratings not only within but also across individuals, speaking to the possibility that much of the variance in human visual preference is shared across individuals. Neuroimaging data revealed that preference computations occur in the brain by means of a graded hierarchical representation of lower and higher level features in the visual system. These features are in turn integrated to compute an overall subjective preference in the parietal and prefrontal cortex. Our findings suggest that rather than being idiosyncratic, human preferences for art can be explained at least in part as a product of a systematic neural integration over underlying visual features of an image. This work not only advances our understanding of the brain-wide computations underlying value construction but also brings new mechanistic insights to the study of visual aesthetics and art appreciation

Aesthetic preference for art emerges from a weighted integration over hierarchically structured visual features in the brain

It is an open question whether preferences for visual art can be lawfully predicted from the basic constituent elements of a visual image. Moreover, little is known about how such preferences are actually constructed in the brain. Here we developed and tested a computational framework to gain an understanding of how the human brain constructs aesthetic value. We show that it is possible to explain human preferences for a piece of art based on an analysis of features present in the image. This was achieved by analyzing the visual properties of drawings and photographs by multiple means, ranging from image statistics extracted by computer vision tools, subjective human ratings about attributes, to a deep convolutional neural network. Crucially, it is possible to predict subjective value ratings not only within but also across individuals, speaking to the possibility that much of the variance in human visual preference is shared across individuals. Neuroimaging data revealed that preference computations occur in the brain by means of a graded hierarchical representation of lower and higher level features in the visual system. These features are in turn integrated to compute an overall subjective preference in the parietal and prefrontal cortex. Our findings suggest that rather than being idiosyncratic, human preferences for art can be explained at least in part as a product of a systematic neural integration over underlying visual features of an image. This work not only advances our understanding of the brain-wide computations underlying value construction but also brings new mechanistic insights to the study of visual aesthetics and art appreciation

Reinforcement learning with associative or discriminative generalization across states and actions: fMRI at 3 T and 7 T.

The model-free algorithms of reinforcement learning (RL) have gained clout across disciplines, but so too have model-based alternatives. The present study emphasizes other dimensions of this model space in consideration of associative or discriminative generalization across states and actions. This generalized reinforcement learning (GRL) model, a frugal extension of RL, parsimoniously retains the single reward-prediction error (RPE), but the scope of learning goes beyond the experienced state and action. Instead, the generalized RPE is efficiently relayed for bidirectional counterfactual updating of value estimates for other representations. Aided by structural information but as an implicit rather than explicit cognitive map, GRL provided the most precise account of human behavior and individual differences in a reversal-learning task with hierarchical structure that encouraged inverse generalization across both states and actions. Reflecting inference that could be true, false (i.e., overgeneralization), or absent (i.e., undergeneralization), state generalization distinguished those who learned well more so than action generalization. With high-resolution high-field fMRI targeting the dopaminergic midbrain, the GRL models RPE signals (alongside value and decision signals) were localized within not only the striatum but also the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area, including specific effects of generalization that also extend to the hippocampus. Factoring in generalization as a multidimensional process in value-based learning, these findings shed light on complexities that, while challenging classic RL, can still be resolved within the bounds of its core computations